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Opportunities to enhance ward audit: a
multi-site qualitative study
Michael Sykes1* , Richard Thomson1, Niina Kolehmainen1, Louise Allan2 and Tracy Finch3
Abstract
Background: Hospitals in many countries are encouraged to develop audits to assess and improve the quality of
care. Ward audit is a specific form of audit and feedback that is commonly used but little studied. The aim of this
study is to describe the content and application of hospital ward audit in order to identify potential enhancements
to such audits.
Methods: Multiple qualitative methods were used to study a diversity sample of four English National Health
Service organisations over a 16-month period. We undertook semi-structured interviews (n = 32), documentary
analysis (n = 44) and 25 h of observations of healthcare workers involved in the design and implementation of ward
audit. Data were analysed using framework analysis. Findings were presented iteratively to stakeholders who used
them to develop a description of the content and delivery of ward audit.
Results: Ward audit consisted of seven stages: impetus; method; preparation of staff; assessing practice; analysis;
feedback; and decide on action to improve. Two key stages were the monthly assessment of practice using case
note data extraction, and the resulting feedback to clinical staff, ward managers, matrons and directors of nursing.
At three organisations, the case note data were extracted by staff and there was evidence that this resulted in
misrepresentation of the clinical performance audited. The misrepresentation appeared to be associated with the
anticipation of punitive feedback from directors of nursing and matrons, as well as time pressures and a lack clarity
about the method of audit data collection. Punitive feedback was reported to occur if no data were collected, if
data demonstrated poor performance or if performance did not improve.
Conclusions: Organisations invest considerable clinical resources in ward audit, but such audits may have
unintended, potentially negative, consequences due to the impacts from punitive feedback. We discuss potential
enhancements to ward audit (e.g. providing feedback recipients with suggested actions for improvement) and
discuss implications for theory. There is a need to reduce the use of punitive feedback.
Keywords: Assurance, Audit and feedback, Hospital, Qualitative, Quality improvement
Background
Globally, hospitals have developed internal quality assur-
ance and improvement structures, of which audit and
feedback is a substantial part [1–4]. Audit and feedback
can be organised at different levels (e.g. nationally, re-
gionally, by hospitals, teams or individuals). One
widespread form of audit and feedback involves ward
managers regularly receiving feedback about the clinical
performance of staff on their ward. This audit measures
the delivery of care (e.g. the prescribing and administra-
tion of medicines, the following of infection control pro-
cedures, the meeting of nutritional needs). Previous
work to describe similar audits has used the terms ‘es-
sence of care’ [5] and ward accreditation audits [6].
Within the current study, the term ‘ward audit’ was
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chosen as a generic way to describe this form of audit
and feedback.
Audit and feedback can be an effective intervention to
improve care, but its effectiveness varies (median abso-
lute improvement 4.3%, interquartile range 0.5–16%) [7].
There is evidence and theory about what determines the
effectiveness of audit and feedback. A systematic review
of randomised controlled trials found that audit and
feedback might be most effective when feedback is given
repeatedly, provided by a supervisor or colleague, pro-
vided verbally and in writing, provided with solutions to
sub-optimal performance, and when there is low base-
line performance [7]. Theories and frameworks identify
further potential influences (e.g. [8–10]) upon the effect-
iveness of audit and feedback. Brown and colleagues [10]
synthesised evidence and theories related to feedback in-
terventions to produce Clinical Performance Feedback
Intervention Theory (CP-FIT). CP-FIT proposes that the
response to feedback is affected by recipient factors (e.g.
their beliefs about the feedback, and their knowledge
and skills in quality improvement), feedback variables
(e.g. the feedback goals, data collection and analysis
methods, and the feedback display and delivery) and
context (including organisation or team characteristics
such as resources, priorities and leadership). CP-FIT de-
scribes multiple mechanisms, such as credibility and so-
cial influence, through which these factors operate to
influence the feedback cycle and, as a result, clinical per-
formance. Colquhoun and colleagues [11] interviewed
experts in diverse theories related to audit and feedback
and generated 313 theory-informed hypotheses of fac-
tors influencing whether audit and feedback leads to im-
provement (e.g. when steps are taken to prevent a
defensive response to the feedback, and when accom-
panied by evidence supporting the behaviour change).
There have been calls to incorporate evidence and the-
ory into the design of audit and feedback; to date much
of this work has focused on national audits (e.g. [12]).
The current study focused on a common form of audit
developed at the organisation-level by hospital em-
ployees. We sought to describe the current content of
ward audit, in order to identify potential evidence- and
theory-informed enhancements.
Method
This was a multi-site study using interviews, observa-
tions and documentary analysis, supported by two
groups of stakeholders: a co-production group and an
advisory group.
We studied four English National Health Service
(NHS) acute hospital provider organisations, with ap-
proximately 4750 beds in total and with each organisa-
tion including between one and four hospitals (Table 1).
Sites were purposively sampled for diversity; sampling
involved identifying sites with different regulator assess-
ment of effectiveness of care (Care Quality Commission
rating from ‘requires improvement’ to ‘outstanding’) and
selecting sites from each rating that varied in both size
(ranging from 4000 to 15,000 full time equivalent staff)
and performance on one of the key national audits (the
National Audit of Dementia Care in General Hospitals)
[13]. We initially sampled three organisations for diver-
sity, the fourth organisation was sampled in order to test
the description of the audit from the earlier sites. For
this fourth site, we sampled a large hospital provider
from a different geographical region that had a ‘requires
improvement’ rating. The purposive sample of inter-
views, observations and documents (Appendix A) sought
diverse perspectives upon the content and delivery of
ward audit and was informed by documents reviewed,
ongoing interviews, observations and stakeholder input,
as described below.
Interviews
The research team, supported by stakeholder involve-
ment, identified potential healthcare professional partici-
pants according to their role. Potential participants were
given information about the study by the hospital re-
search department. All interviewees gave informed
consent. During the semi-structured interviews, the
interviewer (MS) asked participants to describe what
happens during ward audit, exploring how, when, where
and why it is done and involving whom [14]. The topic
guide (Appendix B) explored participant’s involvement
with the audit, their views on its effectiveness and
whether there was anything they would change. The
semi-structured nature enabled exploration of the ele-
ments most relevant to participants. During early inter-
views, the interviewer drew a diagram (Appendix C)
derived from each participant’s descriptions and shared
it with the participant for amendment during the inter-
view. These were collated into a single diagram dis-
cussed with the co-production group and shared with
later interviewees. Later interviewees were asked
whether the diagram matched their experience. Their re-
sponses were used to refine and expand the description
of what happens in ward audit.
Observations
Written consent was sought for the observation of indi-
viduals. Where a group was observed, written, informed
consent was sought from the senior person present, in-
formation was sent to those anticipated to be present
(e.g. to meeting attendees) and posters were displayed
giving information about the observations, the study and
how to have data withdrawn from the study.
During observations, the researcher asked occasional
questions in order to better understand what was being
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observed and to develop rapport with participants [15].
Observation data were recorded as field notes. Add-
itional reflective notes were recorded after both the in-
terviews and observations [16].
Documentary analysis
Documentary analysis gathered data from secondary
sources (e.g. minutes of meetings, policy documents)
[17]. Documents (Appendix A) related to ward audit at
the sites were accessed through the hospital research de-
partment, from participants and via the internet. The
documents were pseudonymised and read in full. MS
considered the position of the author, the intended audi-
ence and purpose of the document before seeking con-
tent that related to ward audit. The selected content was
coded and analysed as described below.
The interviews and observations occurred during dif-
ferent site visits, over the same period as the documen-
tary analysis (January 2018 to April 2019), thereby
enabling each source of data to inform lines of enquiry.
Stakeholder involvement
Work to describe the audit was supported by two stake-
holder groups (Appendix D). A co-production group
met nine times (18 h in total). Co-production group
members were carers (n = 3), clinical leads (e.g. senior
nurses or medical consultants) (n = 3) and organisational
clinical audit leads (n = 3). During the first four co-
production group meetings (8 h), MS facilitated small
group work and whole group discussion to develop a de-
scription of the group’s pre-study understanding of audit
and feedback. MS facilitated the co-production group to:
inform the sampling of documents, and interview and
observation participants; review analysed research data;
consider the differences and similarities between the re-
search data and their pre-study views; identify challenges
to the analysis and interpretation of data; propose fur-
ther avenues to explore; and iteratively develop the de-
scription. An advisory group included patient, academic,
professional body, audit provider and commissioner in-
put; it provided consultation support to the co-
production group via MS. The researcher (MS) is a
nurse who had recently managed organisation-level
quality assurance in the NHS and had training and ex-
perience in qualitative methods and group facilitation.
Analysis and synthesis
Interviews, observation field notes and reflective notes
were transcribed, checked for accuracy and anonymised.
Analysis involved familiarisation with the data followed
by identifying initial themes within two interviews and
two observations. MS compared and contrasted the
themes across data sources and with the initial
participant-described diagrams in order to create an ini-
tial framework. All transcripts were coded. Documents
were pseudonymised, printed, coded and exemplar
quotes extracted. Data were managed using Nvivo v12
(QSR International). MS analysed the data using induct-
ive framework analysis [18], with over one hundred
pages of samples co-coded by another researcher with
extensive training and experience in qualitative methods
(TF). Co-coding involved co-indexing and sorting, com-
parison of results and discussion to resolve disagree-
ments. In addition, extensive quotes for each category
and code were further challenged by all authors, and
credibility increased through stakeholder challenge by
the advisory and co-production group members. The
themes were annotated onto the co-production group’s
pre-study description and presented back to the co-
production group. The group reviewed the annotations
and identified challenges to the analysis and potential al-
ternative sources of information. The process of data
collection, analysis, annotation of the earlier description,
presentation and adaptation was initially repeated twice.
Prior to the third presentation back to the co-
production group, the data were also considered against
a framework for intervention description [19], the previ-
ous systematic review [7] and theory-informed hypoth-
eses about audit and feedback [11]. This stimulated
further questions in the co-production group, which re-
sulted in a further iteration of data gathering, analysis
and presentation. The framework was adapted through-
out data collection to ensure all relevant information
were included. The description from the eighth co-
production group meeting was used to inform a topic
guide for the fourth site where interviews and documen-
tary analysis were undertaken. Following data from this
fourth site, only minor alterations were made to the de-
scription in the ninth group meeting; a marker of theor-
etical saturation.
The study forms part of a larger project to describe
and enhance audit and feedback in dementia care in
Table 1 A description of the NHS organisations and sample
Site (NHS Organisation) Regulator assessment (2014–2016) Interviews Observations Documents
1 Requires improvement 9 9 24
2 Good 8 4 9
3 Outstanding 10 6 7
4 Requires improvement 5 0 4
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acute hospitals that included a focus on both ward audit
and the national audit of dementia [20].
Findings
MS interviewed 32 healthcare staff, undertook 19 obser-
vations (25 h) and analysed 44 documents (Appendix A)
from across the sites, as described in Table 1.
From the analysis, we identified that ward audit in-
volved clinical performance data being presented to
ward managers on a monthly basis. This included per-
formance on: medicine management (e.g. the percentage
of medicine charts where the administered medicines
have were correctly recorded); infection control (e.g. the
percentage of patient records with a visual infusion phle-
bitis score recorded in the last 24 h); nutrition (e.g. the
percentage of patient records with a malnutrition uni-
versal screening tool completed within four hours of ad-
mission); bladder and bowel care (e.g. the percentage of
patients with a urinary catheter who have catheter inser-
tion date written in the records); and communication
(e.g. the percentage of patients’ records with evidence
that discharge has been discussed with carers or
relatives).
We identified two high-level themes: audit stages and
punitive feedback. There were seven different stages to
the audit (Fig. 1): impetus; method; preparation of staff;
assessing practice; analysis; feedback; and decide on ac-
tion to improve. The stages were common across sites,
with differences between sites within each stage, as de-
scribed below. In addition to the stages, there was a
cross-cutting theme of ‘punitive feedback’ which influ-
enced how actors undertook the stages.
Stages of ward audit
The impetus was described as being both from within
and outside the organisation. Internal drivers were to as-
sure and improve care:
“Why have we got a [ward audit] tool? It’s for the ward
sister who owns that environment, to demonstrate
where she thinks she’s up to in that environment. And
that’s the most important thing for me. The results, I
won’t say, don’t matter, but the results are secondary to
that. I don’t like to see a sea of green, I’m much happier
if there is some amber and red on there” (Interview 12,
deputy director of nursing).
External impetus was to enable organisational man-
agers to describe the monitoring of wards to the
regulator:
Interviewer: “If you stopped doing [ward audit] to-
morrow, what would be the impact?”
Matron: “The impact on patients?”
Interviewer: “On patients, on the staff, on the
organisation.”
Fig. 1 The stages of ward monitoring audit
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Matron: “I honestly don’t think that there would be
an impact, directly, on patients. I don’t think it
would change the quality of the documentation or
the quality of care that is given to the patients.”
Interviewer: “Impact for staff?”
Matron: “Possibly relief, they’re not having to do it.
For the organisation, I suppose it’s the accountabil-
ity for giving that assurance to external organisa-
tions. How they’re monitoring the quality, they
would have very little to back that up” (Interview
15).
The audit method was designed by directors of nursing
or their deputies. Different organisations used different
methods to gather data. One extracted audit data from
the electronic record, the other three organisations used
assessment of case notes by clinical staff. Two of the or-
ganisations also collected ward audit data through obser-
vations of practice, as well as staff and patient
interviews.
In the assessment of practice, participants described
that it was important to involve those providing care as
it gave them feedback on the care they deliver; however,
participants reported that self-assessment may affect
data quality. The accuracy of data collection is described
below. Study observations at one site found that com-
pleting five patient interviews and five case note reviews
took over five hours, excluding data entry or staff inter-
view data collection. Immediate clinical issues were
identified (e.g. asking for help applying cream) during
the assessment of practice. However, there was evidence
that some clinical issues (e.g. a patient in the bed oppos-
ite asking for help; a patient repeatedly describing feeling
cold at night) were not addressed.
The ward audit data analysis involved colour coding
the results (e.g. red, amber, green). The targets used dur-
ing the analysis may have been set higher than might be
attained and were perceived as being aspirational (Inter-
view 12, deputy director of nursing). The accuracy of
red- or amber-rated performance was explored with the
team manager; the accuracy of green (high) performance
was not explored. Some actions were described as being
beyond the control of the ward team (e.g. replacing wash
basins).
The organisational board and directorates received
summary data feedback giving collated performance by
multiple wards (Interview 12, deputy director of nursing;
Interview 20, clinical governance facilitator), whilst indi-
vidual ward performance was sent to wards and ma-
trons, directorate managers, directors of nursing and
their deputies. The feedback did not include proposed
solutions to address sub-optimal performance. At one
organisation, ward-level comparison data were anon-
ymised and presented bi-annually to ward managers.
Feedback to ward managers may not be new informa-
tion, and this may affect whether it leads to action:
“As the manager, the matron, we know how we’re
doing. I don't know if I really need this to know
how I'm doing.” (Interview 28, ward manager)
Ward-level feedback was delivered verbally at a ward
team meeting shortly after data were submitted and/or
on receipt of analysed data. The verbal feedback was
sometimes reiterated by email (Interview 21). Verbal
feedback was repeated at daily huddle meetings of
healthcare professionals, although this may depend upon
the ward manager’s attendance at ward huddles (Obser-
vation 10, 12, 15, 16; Documents 25–31). Verbal feed-
back to ward staff may be the only response to poor
performance:
“Sometimes all that’s needed is a butt kicking, if you
know what I mean. A reminder that people need to
get this done.” (Interview 10, Ward manager)
At two organisations, if a ward got consecutive red or
amber results for the same standard, the matron (on be-
half of the director of nursing) asked the ward manager
to write an action plan. These may be escalated to pos-
itional leaders (Interview 17, Directorate manager, Or-
ganisation 1) or specialist teams. Actions may be
documented in an action plan without anticipation of
completion:
There was lots of stuff on it [the action plan] that
you can’t [get]… Estates work, splashbacks that are
stained that there’s no way on God’s good green
earth I’m going to get. This is an old building.
We’ve actioned it.” (Interview 10, ward manager).
Organisation- and directorate-level groups reviewed
ward audit data to look for trends across wards (Inter-
view 20, clinical audit facilitator). Specialist groups (e.g.
medicine management group, pressure ulcer steering
group) within the organisations may also review the data
relevant to that group. In addition, the director or dep-
uty director of nursing reviewed the data. They reported
drawing upon other sources of information, including
staff sickness, agency usage, patient acuity (Interview 4,
directorate manager) and perceptions of team leadership
(Interview 17, directorate manager) to assess whether
and how to act. This triangulation was a reflective or
discursive process (Interview 30, director of nursing).
Each of these stages took place within a wider organ-
isational assurance and improvement system, proposed
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and designed to meet the needs of senior nursing leaders
and external stakeholders.
“I think there’s been a desire in the last five or ten
years to develop a tool that provides objective meas-
urement of the quality of nursing care. I think most
people have developed something internally that ap-
proximates the sorts of things I’ve described” (Inter-
view 30, director of nursing)
“(Ward audit) is talked about as part of the (quality)
account (for regulators and commissioners) … it’s
on there. It doesn’t go into the detail, but it says if
they want it, it’s available for them to talk about.”
(Interview 17, directorate manager)
The delivery and influence of punitive feedback
Punitiveness was a cross-cutting theme that provided an
explanatory link between stages. The data described the
reported experience and anticipation of punitive feedback
and negative consequences by those receiving the feed-
back. Punitiveness largely related to the nature of verbal
feedback described using words such as a ‘kick’ (interview
20, clinical governance facilitator), a ‘slap’ (Interview 30,
Director of nursing), or a ‘whipping’ (Interview 10, ward
manager). There were also non-verbal components, in-
cluding additional scrutiny and senior management visits
to the ward, which were described as intended, “to be per-
suasive or coercive. It depends on your viewpoint.” (Inter-
view 10, ward manager).
Feedback from ward audit was reported to be punitive
at three sites. There was evidence that this experience
and anticipation of punitive feedback resulted in a range
of unintended, potential consequences, (Fig. 2) as de-
scribed below.
Evidence from one site describes that punitive feed-
back was replicated down a communication chain. The
links in the chain were from the director of nursing, to
matrons, to ward managers, to ward staff attending ward
huddle meetings. Punitive feedback was described as
happening in response to: submitting data describing red
or amber rated performance; not submitting data; and
not improving performance:
Ward manager: “They would be down on me like a
tonne of bricks if I didn’t. If I hadn’t inputted the
data, it would be, ‘Where’s your data? Why haven’t
you done it?’ So, it’s just not worth not doing it.”
Interviewer: “Practically, what would that 'tonne of
bricks' involve?”
Ward manager: “Oh, I would get…matron would be
on my back. She’s really good, but somebody would
be on her back. So, it would be like the house of
cards that was toppled from the top and it would be
all down. So, she would be under pressure and she
would put that pressure on me to get that informa-
tion where it should be, or some kind of explanation
as to why it hadn’t been done. It’s just not worth it.”
(Interview 10)
“that ward would just be targeted as a failing ward.
It’s got a lot of work to do. It shouldn’t be that.”
(Interview 15, matron)
The nature of the feedback may not be intentional. For
example, senior nursing leaders described being aware of
the feedback being experienced by recipients as punitive
or inducing fear, and sought to balance this in their at-
tempts to address complacency and produce perform-
ance data that they can, in turn, be described to the
regulator:
“There is a balance, isn’t there? Between, and I’m
not suggesting we’re trying to make people fearful
because we’re absolutely not. But I think, for me, if
I’m responsible for something, I need to know what
standards are expected of me. But I want to know, if
I can’t reach that standard, that someone will sup-
port me. I don’t want to be allowed to do what I
want. We don’t want a complacent environment; we
want people who know they have to work to achieve
something.” (Interview 12, deputy director or
nursing)
“We’re trying to reach standards right across the
hospital and across the other hospitals that you’re
providing the evidence to look at against, so there
wouldn’t be anything [without ward audit]. And
CQC (the regulator), when they come in, we’ve got
something to show, ‘This is how we manage moni-
tor, and manage- ‘, we’d have no evidence really.”
(Interview 17, directorate manager)
Ward managers described both experiencing and antici-
pating punitive feedback from matrons and directors of
nursing. The anticipation of this punitive feedback re-
sulted in two main responses that sought to reduce such
feedback. Firstly, ward managers provided their man-
agers with information about actions being taken to im-
prove sub-optimal care at the point of data entry
(Interview 17, directorate manager). Secondly, the ward
managers may seek to influence future performance by
misrepresenting care.
Ward manager: “I have been known to go, “Yes”
(when it should be no) I’m not going to lie to you.”
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Interviewer: “How does that feel?”
Ward manager: “It feels like it’s a waste of my time.
I’m ticking a box.” (Interview 10)
Misrepresentation may be related to fear of adverse
comparative performance:
“I think they (ward managers) would be honest if
everybody was scoring low. When it’s one out of…
If everybody scored low then it wouldn’t be a prob-
lem, because then everybody has got some improve-
ments to do.” (Interview 15, matron)
Hospital employees involved in the audit at different
levels are aware that the results may not represent
performance:
Matron: “I don’t think that they’re honestly com-
pleted. I think they’re meaningless. “
Interviewer: “And you know that because?”
Matron: “Because you review notes, you look at
notes. Just from ward to ward, notes that come
from another ward – you know, patient transfers.
There is no way that places could be getting 100%.
Often, a lot of places are getting 100% in many of
the domains – or above 98% all of the time.” (Inter-
view 15)
“(Clinical performance is) given the benefit of the
doubt sometimes. I think it’s quite pedantic, the detail
in the [ward audit] tool. So, if you’ve got 15 measures
that tell you whether you get green on a chart, if one’s
missing and you’re the ward sister, you might give
green. Whereas if I’m an auditor, I probably won’t.”
… “I think because it’s human nature. And if you ask
someone to choose five sets of paperwork, which we
do. Audit five sets of patient paperwork, that person
might choose the worst five, they might choose the
best five, and we have no control over that.” (Inter-
view 12, deputy director of nursing)
“There is sometimes a concern of course that people
lie, and they submit data which paints them in a very
positive light.” (Interview 30, director of nursing)
Some ward managers are aware of the temptation to
misrepresent care and delegate responsibility to others:
Fig. 2 A representation of the influence of punitive feedback upon actions to improve care
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“sometimes it’s nice to put a junior member of staff
doing it. They don’t realise what the consequences
are.” (Interview 10, ward manager)
Misrepresentation led to the audit report demonstrating
high performance which was repeatedly described as a
“sea of green” (e.g. Interview 12, Deputy director of
nursing). There was little evidence that the report stimu-
lated organisation-level improvement actions, as repre-
sented by a dotted line in Fig. 2.
As described above, ward-level actions may be docu-
mented in an action plan, as a way to demonstrate a re-
sponse to positional leaders, without anticipation of
completion.
The ward manager may give ward staff feedback about
actual performance but submit data to the corporate
team that misrepresents performance:
“I sort of slap their wrists and tell them to wash
their hands but really, I should mark them down
then slap their wrist” (Interview 10, ward manager)
Directors of nursing, who triangulate the data with other
sources in order to determine the need for action, may
not view the findings as credible:
“You’ll see that the monthly return that I just showed
you is effectively a sea of [perfect]. … I’m an inherent
cynic so I tend to think that if it looks too perfect it
probably isn’t.” (Interview 30, Director of nursing)
External stakeholders (commissioners and regulators)
were told about the presence of ward audit, but not
given the results. That ward audit data may not repre-
sent actual care might not be noticed by the external
stakeholders (Interview 17, directorate manager), as a re-
sult Fig. 2 illustrates a lack of connection between the
feedback and external stakeholder actions.
We found participants reported different reasons for
the data being inaccurate. They reported that people
may submit inaccurate data to save time and/or due to
fear of scrutiny:
“I’m looking forward to a more mechanised tool
which would reduce the audit burden, will release
nurses to nurse, which is a good thing, but also might
improve compliance and objectivity because it will be
easier to do it properly and rather less easy to fake ….
(to) enable them to be freed up to care for the patient
directly.” (Interview 30, director of nursing)
Deputy director of nursing: “I think people just tick
the box sometimes. They’re perhaps not doing the
audits as thoroughly as they should.”
Interviewer: “Why not?”
Deputy director of nursing: “I don’t know really.
Why would you not do it? Perhaps you want to be
100%, perhaps you’re frightened of the scrutiny it
will bring you if you’re not 100%, perhaps it’s just
the easiest thing to do.” (Interview 18)
Other positional leaders (e.g. directorate managers, dep-
uty directors and directors of nursing) reported not be-
ing aware of how the feedback were perceived (Interview
30, director of nursing).
We found at least two organisational responses to ad-
dress data quality. Firstly, there was evidence that orga-
nisations deliberately duplicated audits (Interview 12,
deputy director of nursing), such that the same topic
was assessed by different people through different audits
(e.g. Observation 29). More recently, organisations have
adopted additional approaches to address data quality;
for example, one organisation was purchasing hand-held
computers. The reported rationale for the computers
was that they would be more reliable as it would give
ward managers “fewer reasons for them to wish to
cheat” because it would be quicker and data entry could
be monitored (Interview 30, director of nursing). One
organisation had developed, and one was developing, an
accreditation approach to ward performance monitoring.
This approach involved wards seeking recognition for
the quality of care on the ward. Whether the ward
achieved the status of a high-performing ward was based
upon an assessment of care undertaken by the corporate
nursing team, rather than ward staff. This may have al-
tered ward managers’ willingness to report high
performance:
“People have been hesitant to recommend their
ward for assessment despite the fact that when they
do the audit and when they report the audit they’re
indicating compliance but they’re nervous because
they think just that one day when somebody else
comes to look at it there could be that variance.”
(Interview 19, deputy director of nursing)
Discussion
We explored ward audit at four diverse NHS organisa-
tions through interviews, observations and documentary
analysis. We used inductive framework analysis, itera-
tively presenting the findings to stakeholders for chal-
lenge, to direct further data collection and to integrate
the findings into a description of how audit was under-
taken. We found that reporting the presence of ward
audit to external stakeholders, notably the regulator
(Care Quality Commission), was an important driver to
positional leader support and organisational investment
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in the audit. The method of audit involved monthly data
collection, typically by ward staff, in relation to topics in-
cluding medicine management, infection control, nutri-
tion, bladder and bowel care, and communication. We
present the findings as a description of stages, before de-
scribing key findings regarding the nature of feedback
and the accuracy of the data: Firstly, that feedback pass-
ing from more-senior to less-senior nurses was often
perceived as punitive. Secondly, that ward collected data
may not accurately represent the actual care provided.
Furthermore, there was awareness at multiple levels that
the results might not accurately represent clinical
performance.
In discussing our findings, we compare the current
content of ward audit to evidence [7] and theory [11],
including CP-FIT [10] which was published after the
data analysis. We present potential enhancements based
upon this comparison. We then discuss potential adverse
consequences from the current use of ward audit feed-
back and propose an intervention to address the use pu-
nitive feedback.
Our findings show that ward audit contains features
consistent with audit and feedback evidence [7] and the-
ory [10, 11]; evidence and theories also describe content
which might enhance ward audit. Table 2 describes how
current ward audit might be enhanced. For example,
there is evidence and theory that presenting solutions to
sub-optimal performance might make feedback more ef-
fective; as such, exploring influences upon performance
and describing potential actions may support feedback
recipients to improve care.
Comparing our findings with CP-FIT [10] identifies
similarities between our inductively developed findings
and this more recent theory. We found that the design
stage involved goal setting, assessment of practice in-
volved data collection followed by analysis and feedback.
Like CP-FIT, we describe unintended consequences
where “health professionals may unethically manipulate
data” (Brown et al., 2019); We also describe motivations
for doing so.
We found potential extensions to CP-FIT: we describe
the impetus stage, which whilst apparently similar to
goal setting, related not to “the clinical topic and its as-
sociated clinical behaviours or patient” (Brown et al.,
2019), but to the rationale for undertaking the audit. We
found that this included the motivation to meet the reg-
ulator’s requirements. We found non-acceptance by se-
nior managers of high performance, which differs from
the non-acceptance of low performance by recipients de-
scribed by Brown et al. We found different levels of ac-
tion (patient, team, organisational and external), and
describe differing responses by recipients at each of
these levels. For example, triangulation at the organisa-
tional level demonstrated CP-FIT’s verification of all re-
sults, but only of ‘red’ results at the team-level.
In contrast to Brown et al., we found that the target
(green-rated care) was important, as it was a proxy for
the avoidance of anticipated punitive feedback. We de-
scribe the role of previous feedback upon data collection
and ward managers’ anticipation of future feedback.
Brown et al. state, “health professionals often had pro-
found emotional reactions to feedback, both positive and
negative…, we found no reliable evidence that these dir-
ectly influenced the feedback cycle.”(p15). We describe
the influence of the ward managers’ anticipation of puni-
tive feedback, a subsequent emotional response (fear)
and a behavioural response (misrepresentation of per-
formance). We found that these responses impacted
upon organisation-level leaders’ verification perceptions,
acceptance, intention and behaviour. In CP-FIT, this in-
fluence may represent an additional health professional
variable acting through social influence, credibility and
actionability upon the feedback cycle. Articulating the
influence of the previous experience of feedback upon
Table 2 Consistency with selected evidence and theory and potential enhancements
Findings consistent with selected evidence and theory Findings different from selected
evidence and theory
Potential evidence- and theory-informed
enhancement
Feedback given by supervisor or peer [7] (e.g. ward manager to
ward staff)
Feedback given repeatedly [7] (e.g. daily at ward huddle
meeting)
The audit provides feedback to ward staff describing recent
(this month’s) performance [10, 11], aside from issues of data
accuracy.
Feedback gains attention [11]
Feedback to ward staff is given in person [11]
Feedback to ward staff is given to a group [10, 11]
Recipients feel it is imposed upon
them [10]
Data is gathered by feedback
recipients [10]
The feedback is not perceived as
accurate / credible [10, 11]
Feedback describes team level,
rather than individual, performance
[10, 11]
Feedback does not indicate trend
over time [10]
Feedback does not include solutions
to sub-optimal performance [7, 10,
11]
Feedback is perceived to punish
sub-optimal performance [10]
Meaningful engagement of staff in the audit
re-design
Minimise data collection by automating and
using alternative data sources, where
possible
Address impacts upon data quality, as
discussed below.
Individualise feedback
Present performance over time
Explore influences upon performance and
describe how improvements can be made
Explore and address causes of punitive
feedback, as discussed below
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pre-conceptions and subsequent actions provides a valu-
able extension to CP-FIT.
In addition to not incorporating best practices, our
findings suggest that ward audit has potential negative
impacts upon care. We propose two mechanisms by
which the audit may adversely affect patient care: oppor-
tunity cost and an erosion of standards of care. There is
considerable opportunity cost and evidence that staff
prioritise data collection over direct patient care. For ex-
ample, observations at one site suggested that the gath-
ering of case note data took over five hours per month
per ward and was done by ward managers or their dep-
uties, with further time spent interviewing staff and en-
tering data. There was some evidence that clinical issues
were identified and addressed during this time (e.g. a pa-
tient requiring help to apply a cream), but there was also
evidence that staff prioritised data collection over patient
care (e.g. not going to a patient who requested help).
Whilst purposive sampling undermines the drawing of
economic conclusions, we propose that the time cost
may exceed the benefits seen from some limited changes
occurring in care as a result of the audit.
The requirement for nursing staff to spend time gath-
ering ward audit data may have a more subtle effect:
participants described ward audit as ‘a waste of my time’
and ‘meaningless’. We propose that the external priori-
tisation of perceived low value work may create feelings
of discomfort in those being asked to prioritise time to-
wards data collection for the audit. This discomfort may
stem from being unable to meet personal goals relating
to the delivery of high-quality care and externally set
goals about the collection of data. It is possible that par-
ticipants resolve this discomfort by downgrading their
goals relating to standards of care [21]. Evidence that
this might have happened comes from the finding that
staff prioritised data collection over providing care to
patients.
We found evidence that feedback was experienced as
punitive. This supports earlier findings describing puni-
tive perceptions of audit [22]. There is evidence [23] and
theory [10, 24] that punitive feedback is less effective at
improving care. We propose two mechanisms by which
punitive feedback may affect patient care. Firstly, the ex-
perience of receiving punitive feedback may affect recipi-
ents’ mental health [25] and result in decreased staff
satisfaction, which has been associated with increased
staff turnover, reduced quality of care and lower patient
satisfaction [24].
Secondly, we found that previous punitive feedback
led to anticipated negative consequences which affected
subsequent data quality. We found that the data was re-
ported to be inaccurate and not credible. We propose
that the lack of accuracy and credibility influenced com-
mitment to change. Viewing the findings through the
lens of clinical performance feedback intervention theory
(CP-FIT), directors and deputy directors of nursing re-
ceive feedback through a table showing banded (red,
amber, green) performance of teams. Their goal is to
have high performance that provides assurance about
the quality of care. They pay attention to red and amber
performance, reflectively and discursively triangulating it
with other data sources including acuity (patient popula-
tion) and their perceptions of ward staffing and leader-
ship (team characteristics). However, the subsequent
organisation-level action response was mediated by a
lack of accuracy (most results were ‘green’ and as a re-
sult no action plan was developed) and may have been
affected by the reported lack of credibility, resulting in
reduced commitment to change. Punitive feedback has
been described as being less actionable at the individual
level [23]. Our findings suggest that punitive feedback is
also less actionable at the organisational level. The im-
pact upon data quality and commitment to change high-
lights a potential concern for audits designed to be
punitive (e.g .[26]). Reducing the use of punitive feed-
back may enhance the effectiveness of ward audit.
Future work should seek to implement enhancements
to ward audit, including seeking to reduce the use of pu-
nitive feedback. Addressing punitive feedback may re-
quire consideration of the influences upon its use; for
example, punitive feedback has been associated with
leaders’ attributions that performance is related to indi-
vidual, rather than system causes, or that performance is
due to a lack of effort, rather than lack of ability or train-
ing [27]. An intervention targeting the attributions of
those involved in the delivery of punitive feedback (e.g.
directors of nursing, deputy directors of nursing, ma-
trons, ward managers) may reduce recipient experience
of punishment and increase the actionability of the
feedback.
Reporting to the regulator was an important impetus
to the ward audit. The regulator may also have a role in
influencing the effectiveness of ward audit; for example,
regulators could explore ward audit data quality through
triangulation with other data, and/or by asking how
ward audit stimulates organisation-level improvements
based upon a review of influences upon performance.
One organisation had developed, and one was develop-
ing, accreditation mechanisms, whereby corporate nurs-
ing teams assess performance. Such accreditation audits
have since been nationally recommended [28]. Our find-
ings suggest that significant implementation work may
be required to develop the collective leadership [28–30]
and supportive culture [9] that would facilitate improve-
ments from such accreditation systems. Current
guidance [28] does not address this aspect of implemen-
tation. Another organisation in our study was investing
further in electronic devices on which staff could record
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the data; this was described as a way to save time and
potentially increase reliability. Future work could explore
the impact of changes to data collection upon data
accuracy.
Strengths and limitations
We used multiple methods and triangulated data to ex-
plore ward audit at diverse NHS organisations. The
findings were presented to a stakeholder group for chal-
lenge, to identify where further data were needed and to
synthesise the description. As part of this work to en-
hance the credibility of the findings, the research team
and stakeholder group considered emergent findings
against a framework for intervention description, and
against previous evidence and theory.
We do not provide identifiers as to which findings
came from the which organisation in order to protect
the anonymity of participants. The fourth site was sam-
pled to test the description based upon data from earlier
sites, and had the same CQC rating as an earlier site.
We did not sample hospitals rated as ‘inadequate’; hospi-
tals with this rating may have used different approaches
to ward audit from the sites we studied. We describe re-
ported perceptions of feedback. The nature of feedback
beyond ward level was not observed and it may be that
ward managers feel that the data profiles their personal
performance, and that this makes feedback feel punitive
[31]. However, the repeated description, and the ob-
served and reported impact upon the assessment of
practice, support the findings we report. Additionally,
that feedback was perceived as punitive may be more
important than an assessment of its actual content and
delivery.
We describe a communication chain at one site from
director of nursing to ward staff. It is possible that there
are other links in this chain. No assumption is made as
to the intention or source of the nature of the feedback.
In particular, it may be that the delivery, experience or
anticipation of punitive feedback reflects organisational
norms regarding attributions or patterns of communica-
tion; it may also reflect external influence [32].
Conclusions
Organisations invest considerable resources in ward
audit. We highlight evidence and theory-informed en-
hancements to ward audit. In particular, there is evi-
dence that at some organisations the data are reported
to be unreliable, that this is recognised by those involved
and that data accuracy is associated with feedback being
perceived as punitive. We recommend that recipients of
ward audit data explore the reliability of the data and
consider the potential role of punitive feedback as a fac-
tor undermining data quality and subsequent quality im-
provement. We propose national and organisation-level
work to enhance ward audit, including through the im-
plementation of non-punitive feedback.
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